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Although the case of St George’s Health Care NHS Trust v S, R v Collins and others ex parte 
S1 reiterates general principles of patient autonomy and self-determination, it is of special 
significance for women because of its unequivocal affirmation that a competent pregnant 
woman can refuse medical treatment even if that refusal may result in harm to her or the 
foetus.2  It also establishes that mental health legislation cannot be used to prevent a 
competent pregnant woman from exercising this right.  In confirming that the right of an 
adult of sound mind to refuse any or all medical treatment ‘reflects the autonomy of each 
individual and the right of self-determination’,3 the Court of Appeal held that  
 
while pregnancy increases the personal responsibilities of a woman it does not 
diminish her entitlement to decide whether or not to undergo medical 
treatment…an unborn child is not a separate person from its mother. Its need 
for medical assistance does not prevail over her rights.4    
 
St George’s Health Care Trust v S, R v Collins and others ex parte S thus addresses three 
important issues: first, a pregnant woman’s right to decline medical treatment even where this 
may harm her unborn child; second, that this right is not diminished because her decision to 
exercise it contravenes societal expectations of pregnant women or appears morally 
repugnant; and third, mental health legislation cannot be deployed to detain and treat an 
individual against her will merely because her thinking process is unusual or even bizarre, 
irrational, and contrary to the views of most people. In the case of a pregnant woman, the fact 
that her thinking may result in harm to her unborn baby does not mean that she must 
therefore be mentally disordered.  
 
Context 
Historically, women have existed in the domain of the ‘private’, especially in relation to 
pregnancy and motherhood. Often this meant that the voices and experiences of pregnant 
women were silenced or minimised. There is a long association of female reproduction with 
weakness or ‘hysteria’, which was said to show that women were unfit to participate in the 
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‘public’, masculine world.5  The view that pregnant women should surrender decision-
making to doctors and that women’s own experiences and preferences were less important 
than the opinions of the medical profession persisted into the twentieth century, as expressed 
in particularly extreme form in a 1980s handbook on pregnancy: 
 
why do women have to recount such stories to one another, especially when 
the majority of them are so blatantly untrue … Probably more is done by 
wicked women with their malicious lying tongues to harm the confidence and 
happiness of pregnant woman than by another other single factor.6 
 
Hostility to the notion that women may wish to have some control over their experience of 
pregnancy and childbirth is reflected in attitudes to the capacity of pregnant women to make 
decisions about their own bodies.  The law presumes that every adult is competent provided 
she is able to understand and retain information and weigh it as part of the process of arriving 
at the decision.7  The presumption is not displaced simply because a decision is not one of 
which most people would approve, nor is it rebutted simply because a person has a mental 
illness. Nevertheless, pregnant women often find themselves absorbed into a medical process 
in which it is assumed that they will defer to the expertise of those treating them.  This 
expectation of deference is bolstered by prevailing expectations of how pregnant women 
should behave – as captured in Anne Morris’ discussion of the Victorian poem ‘Angel in the 
House’, which praises the ‘sublime altruism of one whose desires are subordinated to the 
happiness of others’.8  A pregnant woman is expected to do all she can to promote the welfare 
of the foetus.  Those women who fail to do this have been labelled ‘bizarre,’9 ‘not very 
bright’,10 ‘difficult’,11, ‘angry … and uncooperative12 or simply mad or bad mothers.13  In 
other words, a woman’s refusal to follow medical advice is taken not just as an indication of a 
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lack of proper femininity, but also as a lack of competence.14 In 1996, in Rochdale 
Healthcare NHS Trust v C, Johnson J held that the ‘acute emotional stress and physical 
strain’ of labour rendered C incapable of making a decision even of the most trivial kind.15  
This was despite the fact that C had refused a caesarean based on her previous bad experience 
of such intervention, and that her obstetrician was of the opinion that she was competent to 
refuse.    
 
A further challenge to women’s control over their bodies and their pregnancies has been the 
increasing medicalisation of pregnancy and childbirth, which has accompanied a shift from 
childbirth at home to delivery in hospital, and from midwifery to obstetrics.16 While the 
increased availability of free ante-natal care and hospital delivery following the creation of 
the NHS in 1948 was an important factor in reducing maternal mortality rates, Anne Oakley 
suggests that that the move from midwife-managed home delivery to delivery by 
obstetricians in hospitals was not simply due to social and medical advancement but was part 
of a power struggle over the language, control and cultural construction of childbirth. Oakley 
argues that assumption of control of pregnancy and childbirth by doctors in the second half of 
the twentieth century was accompanied by a side-lining and denigration of midwives who 
were represented as ‘half taught’ or ‘totally ignorant’.17 Increased medical control of 
pregnancy has been accompanied by its ‘pathologisation’: treating pregnancy as illness with 
imminent complications.18  Pregnant women undergo (usually very willingly) tests, scans and 
screenings which can enhance the experience of pregnancy and be life-saving, but which may 
also lead to an increased number of interventions.  Deliveries by caesarean section, for 
example, have risen from four per cent of births in 1970 to 26.5 per cent in 2014-15 in 
England.19    
 
The Landmark 
The socio-historical context sheds light on why the question of pregnant women’s autonomy 
became so highly contested in St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S; and why S’s refusal to 
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have a caesarean section presented such a strong challenge to the dominant assumptions that 
regulate pregnancy and labour.  
 
S was 29 years old and 36 weeks pregnant when on 25 April 1996 she sought to register at a 
doctor’s surgery having not received any previous ante-natal care. She was diagnosed with 
pre-eclampsia, a condition that can endanger the life of the woman and foetus.  S declined the 
recommended treatment, which included an early induced delivery. Her refusal led to her 
immediate compulsory detention in hospital under section 2 of the Mental Health Act 1983 
for assessment because it was feared that her mental state ‘may be compromising her ability 
to make decisions’ and that she was ‘probably depressed’.  In the face of her continuing 
refusal to consent to treatment, an application was made to the High Court by the hospital for 
a declaration that it would be lawful to proceed with a caesarean section without her consent.   
 
The Court did not hear from S even though she had instructed solicitors and had expressed 
very clearly in writing that she understood the risks of pre-eclampsia, but that she had always 
held ‘very strong views’ with respect to medical and surgical treatment and opposed medical 
intervention in her pregnancy.  She emphasised her own strong belief that ‘natural events’, 
including death, should not be interfered with.   
 
At the hearing, however, the fact that S had instructed solicitors was not made clear, nor were 
S’s solicitors made aware of the proceedings.  The judge was informed that S was suffering 
from severe pre-eclampsia, that she had been admitted to hospital under section 2 of the 
Mental Health Act 1983, that an assessment of her mental and psychiatric condition was 
'ongoing', that 'moderate depression' had been diagnosed, and that she was refusing any 
intervention.   Beyond that, the question of her capacity to consent was not addressed. It was 
also – mistakenly – claimed that S had been in labour for 24 hours, when in fact labour had 
not yet begun.   
 
Permission to perform a caesarean section was granted and S was delivered of a baby girl by 
emergency caesarean section. While not resisting sedation or anesthetisation, S refused to 
sign the operation consent form and so it proceeded on the basis of the court order. 
Several months after these events, S applied for judicial review of the High Court order, 
arguing that her admission, detention and treatment were unlawful.  She also appealed against 
the declaration authorising the caesarean section.  The Court of Appeal found in her favour in 
all aspects.  In relation to her detention under the Mental Health Act 1983, it was held that  
 
The [Mental Health] Act cannot be deployed to achieve the detention of an 
individual against her will merely because her thinking process is unusual, 
even apparently bizarre and irrational, and contrary to the views of the 
overwhelming majority of the community at large.20   
 
The Court noted that the approach taken to S by those around her had been that it was so 
bizarre for a pregnant woman to refuse treatment for herself and the foetus that she had to be 
mentally ill. Under the Mental Health Act, however, compulsory detention for assessment is 
lawful only where certain conditions are met and, in particular, the mental disorder must be 
serious enough to warrant detention.  Here, it was clear that detention had occurred not 
because of S’s supposed mental disorder, but because of her physical condition (pre-
eclampsia).  If she had not been pregnant and physically unwell, there would have been no 
question of detaining her under the Act.  Her detention was therefore unlawful.  As far as the 
non-consensual treatment was concerned, the Court upheld the right of a competent adult to 
refuse even life-saving treatment.  This extends to pregnant women even though ‘pregnancy 
increased the personal responsibilities of a woman’.21  The needs of the unborn child do not 
‘prevail over her right not to be forced to submit to an invasion of her body against her will’ 
and that right ‘was not reduced or diminished merely because her decision to exercise it 
might appear morally repugnant’.22 In the absence of lawful justification, removal of the baby 
from within S’s body under physical compulsion was an infringement of her autonomy and a 
trespass to her person.  
 
What Happened Next 
Five days after the emergency caesarean, S discharged herself from hospital.  Initially, she 
rejected her baby and considered having her adopted or fostered.  However, she later 
reconsidered, fought for, and won custody of her daughter.23  In part, it was this battle for 
custody, which led to the lengthy delay between S’s detention and the Appeal Court hearing.  
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The Appeal Court’s judgment itself was generally well-received, with a leader in the 
Independent newspaper proclaiming it a ‘loud clear blast on the trumpet of liberty from the 
Court of Appeal.’24  The paper went on to say that ‘women have been bullied and coerced 
into Caesareans and hysterectomies to an extent which is an affront to the liberal values of a 
civilised society.’ Of course, one judicial decision is not going to bring about a sudden 
transformation of attitudes to pregnant women.  Indeed, St George’s Heathcare NHS Trust v 
S had been foreshadowed by an earlier Court of Appeal decision in Re MB25 in which the 
Court had again asserted the right of a pregnant woman to refuse treatment but then went on 
to find that MB was lacking in capacity because of her phobia of needles. The Courts have 
continued to authorise caesarean sections on non-consenting women, including those who are 
compulsorily detained under the Mental Health Act 1983.26  Moreover, despite policies which 
aim to put the woman at the heart of maternity care, and national guidance which states that 
‘women's decisions should be respected, even when this is contrary to the views of the 
healthcare professional’,27 women are not always listened to.  One survey suggested that only 
50 per cent of women questioned felt they had experienced the birth they wanted.28  It is 
undeniable that pregnancy and childbirth remains a contested sphere. 
 
Significance 
What then is the significance of St George’s Health Care NHS Trust v S? First, it should be 
noted that the case is not primarily about the rights and wrongs of medical intervention in 
pregnancy.  Nobody would suggest that women would be better off without the life-saving 
technologies and procedures to which women in the developed world have access.  Nor 
would it be fair to overlook the fact that those involved in this case were motivated by what 
they saw as the interests of the woman and her foetus.  Rather, the legacy of St George’s 
Healthcare NHS Trust v S is the clear statement that a pregnant woman is not be treated as 
incapable of making a decision simply because she chooses something that many would judge 
to be misguided, or even immoral.  Equally important is the finding that competent pregnant 
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women may not be detained under mental health legislation in order to be compulsorily 
treated for a physical rather than a mental condition.   
 
The case sets out clear markers against which court-authorised caesareans must be tested and 
affirms the autonomy of the pregnant women in medical decision-making. It also highlights 
the importance of listening to women and involving them in the decision-making processes 
during pregnancy and childbirth.  The ongoing influence of the case can be seen in 
Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board (General Medical Council intervening).  Here,  an 
obstetrician took the view that it was not ‘in the maternal interests for women to have 
caesarean sections’, and failed to offer a women with a high-risk pregnancy a caesarean 
section, despite the risks of vaginal delivery.29   In her judgment Lady Hale commented that 
the doctor seemed to have judged that vaginal delivery was ‘morally preferable’ to caesarean 
section. Referring to St George’s she held:  
 
A patient is entitled to take into account her own values, her own assessment 
of the comparative merits of giving birth in the “natural” and traditional way 
and of giving birth by caesarean section, whatever medical opinion may say, 
alongside the medical evaluation of the risks to herself and her baby.  She may 
place great value on giving birth in the natural way and be prepared to take the 
risks to herself and her baby which this entails. The medical profession must 
respect her choice, unless she lacks the legal capacity to decide … There is no 
good reason why the same should not apply in reverse, if she is prepared to 
forgo the joys of natural childbirth in order to avoid some not insignificant 
risks to herself or her baby. She cannot force her doctor to offer treatment 
which he or she considers futile or inappropriate. But she is at least entitled to 
the information which will enable her to take a proper part in that decision.30 
 
This shows the positive impact of the landmark decision, but it should not be overlooked that 
the Court of Appeal in St George’s Healthcare Trust NHS Trust v S did not suggest that S’s 
refusal of treatment was to be condoned or approved. This is important because the historical 
context of pregnancy, maternity and motherhood continues to influence views and attitudes 
going far beyond the issue of non-consensual caesarean sections.  Campaigns concerned with 
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foetal rights, abortion, new technologies, IVF and surrogacy have all raised issues of 
decision-making, autonomy and capacity.   Lady Hale noted in Montgomery:  
 
Gone are the days when it was thought that, on becoming pregnant, a woman 
lost, not only her capacity, but also her right to act as a genuinely autonomous 
human being.31 
 
The decision in St George’s Trust v S remains a landmark because it insists that we are 
vigilant in ensuring that women are not silenced or side-lined within their own experiences of 
pregnancy and childbirth. 
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